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Abstract
We build a multi-sector spatial general equilibrium model to account for China’s ex-
port surge between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the role of the reductions in tariffs and in-
ternal migration costs during that period. Our model generates a closed-form aggregate
trade elasticity that can be decomposed into four margins of adjustments. Two are the
commonly studied intensive and extensive margins of exports (Chaney, 2008). The remain-
ing two margins are the new-firm margin and the export-regime margin, for which we have
found empirical support and used our reduced-form evidence to discipline the structural
parameters. Using the calibrated model, we find that the reductions in tariffs and internal
migration costs accounted for a third of China’s export growth between 1990 and 2005.
Among the four margins, we find that the new-firm margin played an important role in
amplifying the effect of these policy changes on export growth.
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migration; firm location choices.
*Chen Liu: ecsliuc@nus.edu.sg. Xiao Ma: xim032@ucsd.edu. We are grateful to Gordon Hanson and Na-
talia Ramondo for invaluable discussions and comments. We are also grateful to participants at the UC San
Diego graduate student lunch seminar for helpful comments. We would also like to thank Robert Feenstra and
the Center for International Data at the University of California, Davis for sharing data on China’s customs
transactions for the period 1988–1991 with us. All potential errors are our own.
1
1 Introduction
From 1980 to 2005, the share of global trade of “Made in China” goods grew from 0.8% to
13%. While a large number of literature has examined the consequences of China’s export
surge (see Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2016), fewer papers have focused on the sources causing
China’s export surge. In this paper, we quantify the relative contributions of several factors
to China’s export surge.
We build a multi-sector spatial general equilibrium model featuring heterogeneous firms’
and workers’ location choices. We account for China’s export surge between 1990 and 2005
in light of three policy changes: changes in China’s import tariffs, changes in tariffs imposed
against China’s exports, and changes in barriers to internal migration in China. Theoretically,
we decompose the aggregate trade elasticity into four margins of firm adjustments and show
that each margin has an analytic expression. Two adjustments are the standard intensive and
extensive margins of trade (Chaney, 2008). The other two are the location switching of firms,
referenced as the new-firm margin, and the choice of firms between processing and ordinary
export regimes, referenced as the export-regime margin.1 Empirically, we find support for the
new-firm and export-regime margins by using provincial and sectoral variation on the changes
in the number of firms in response to the changes in the scale of migrant employment and the
changes in import tariffs respectively. Finally, we use our empirical estimates to discipline
our model parameters and evaluate the importance of each margin in accounting for China’s
export surge.
Our model has three main components. First, each firm draws a vector of correlated
productivities across foreign countries, Chinese provinces, and export regimes (processing
or ordinary). The second component is the inter-sectoral input-output linkages (Caliendo
and Parro, 2015). The third component is that Chinese workers with heterogeneous loca-
tion preferences and migration costs sort into provinces and sectors. In this setting, a policy
shock generates four types of firm adjustments. For instance, a reduction in China’s im-
port tariffs lowers the costs of intermediate inputs and attracts more firms to locate in China
(the new-firm margin). Further, ordinary export production is subject to nominal import tar-
iffs, whereas imported intermediate materials are duty-free for processing export produc-
tion. Import tariff reductions thus induce switching from processing to ordinary regime (the
export-regime margin). Moreover, the reduced costs of intermediate inputs incentivize existing
exporters to export more (the intensive margin) and lead to some previously non-exporting
firms to begin exporting (the extensive margin).
1Export processing is the process where firms import raw materials or intermediate inputs from abroad and
export the final goods after some processing (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005). Processing firms are not allowed to
sell output domestically.
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We derive analytic results that decompose the aggregate trade elasticity into four mar-
gins. The intensive margin and the extensive margin replicate the exact formula in Chaney
(2008). We show that the new-firm margin is determined by the correlation of firms’ pro-
ductivity draws across locations, and the export-regime margin depends on the correlation of
firms’ productivity draws between processing and ordinary regimes. This analytic result is
important as it guides our empirical strategy to discipline the parameter values for the new-
firm and export-regime margins. It also guides our parameter restrictions for our quantitative
exercises to decompose the export impact into four margins of firm adjustments.
We assemble a dataset from various Chinese sources to show that the new-firm and export-
regime margins are prominent in the time period of this study. First, we validate the new-firm
margin by showing that between 1990 and 2005, the rise in migrant employment strongly in-
creased the number of firms across provinces and sectors. To address the endogeneity issues,
we construct a Card-type instrument for changes in migrant employment in each province
and sector by exploiting historical patterns of location and sector sorting for workers from
different provinces of origin. Second, to validate the export-regime margin, we use provincial
import penetration and sectoral input-output linkages to construct changes in production
costs resulting from import tariff reductions (WTO). We instrument potentially endogenous
tariff changes with maximum tariff levels under the WTO agreement, extending the strategy
developed in Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang (2017). We explore cross-sectoral
variation to find that decreases in import tariffs led to a rise in the relative number of ordi-
nary firms to processing firms.2
We rely on the reduced-form estimates to discipline the two key model parameters that
govern the new-firm and export-regime margins using an indirect inference approach. Specifi-
cally, we choose the correlation of productivity draws across locations to target our reduced-
form estimate on the extent to which the number of firms responded to migration shocks.
We choose the correlation of productivity draws between ordinary and processing regimes
to target our reduced-form estimate on the response of the relative number of ordinary to
processing firms to import tariff changes.
We combine detailed transaction-level customs data, firm-level data, international and in-
tranational trade data, and micro-level population census data to account for China’s export
surge due to the three policy changes mentioned above. Our quantitative model includes
29 sectors, 2 export regimes (processing and ordinary), 30 Chinese provinces, and 36 foreign
countries. We measure changes in tariffs on China’s imports, tariffs on China’s exports, and
2This channel was first studied in Brandt and Morrow (2017) who focused on how the value share of exports
organized through ordinary trade responded to tariff changes. In contrast, in order to discipline our model
parameter on firm adjustments of export regimes, we use the relative number between ordinary and processing
exporters as the dependent variable.
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internal migration barriers. After that, we perform two sets of counterfactual exercises. In
the first set of exercises, we introduce each shock to our model, one at a time. With these
exercises, we quantify the extent to which each shock promoted China’s aggregate export
growth between 1990 and 2005. In the second set of exercises, we re-introduce each shock
to our model under parameter restrictions based on the analytic decomposition. With these
exercises, we decompose the export growth resulting from each shock into four margins of
firm adjustments.
We find that the three policies combined accounted for 29% of China’s export growth be-
tween 1990 and 2005. More notably, the new-firm margin was important in explaining China’s
export surge: if we held the number of firms constant, the portion of China’s export surge ex-
plained by the three shocks combined would drop to 16%. This difference suggests that the
emergence of new firms resulting from (trade and migration) barrier reductions explained
13% of China’s export surge. Individually, reductions in China’s import tariffs explained
13%, whereas changes in foreign tariffs on China’s exports and reductions in internal migra-
tion barriers each accounted for around 8% respectively. We also find that each shock had
differential impacts on processing and ordinary exports: import tariff reductions operated
primarily by boosting ordinary exports, whereas the reductions in migration barriers and in
foreign tariffs on China’s exports both favored processing exports.
Our paper relates to the quantitative trade and spatial equilibrium literature that studies
the impact of goods and labor market integration (e.g., Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Redding
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, among others). On the topic of China’s internal migration and
trade, Tombe and Zhu (2019) analyze its impact on aggregate productivity, and Fan (2019)
studies its distributional impact.3 Both papers adopt the multi-sector Eaton-Kortum (EK)
models where the scale of the economy does not change with migration or trade shocks.
Complementing these two papers, we quantify the extent to which the impact of trade
and migration barrier reduction on China’s aggregate economic outcomes can be amplified
through the creation of new firms. We build upon Arkolakis, Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare
and Yeaple (2018) (ARRY hereafter) to model firm location choices. Comparing to a model
with firm entry, the advantage of modeling firm location choices is to allow arbitrary non-
negative values on the elasticity of firm switching with respect to the size of local population
and we discipline this elasticity using reduced-form estimates.4 We also incorporate firm
3Also see Ma and Tang (2020) and Zi (2020).
4We do not choose a model with firm entry as our benchmark approach as it imposes strong restrictions
on the relationship between the number of firms and population size. As shown in Arkolakis, Costinot and
Rodríguez-Clare (2012), among the broad class of trade models, the free-entry condition implies the number
of firms responds one-to-one to local population. In Appendix E, we also use an alternative model with firm
entry as a robustness check. As we extend the ARRY model to a nested-CES demand system, our paper relates
to the quantitative trade literature with non-CES demand systems (Adao, Costinot and Donaldson, 2017; Lind
and Ramondo, 2018).
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sorting into ordinary and processing regimes to distinguish the differential tariff treatments
between the two regimes (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). In this aspect, our paper relates to
Brandt, Li and Morrow (2018), who build an EK model with ordinary and processing regimes
to quantify the welfare losses of restricting processing output from selling domestically. The
main difference of our approach is that we decompose export growth into multiple margins
of adjustments.
Recent papers find that the decline of trade barriers and China’s WTO accession had a
significant contribution to China’s productivity growth (Yu, 2015; Brandt et al., 2017). One
important source behind the rapid productivity growth is the massive number of new firms
(Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012). Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013) find that
the elimination of export quota boosted export growth, which was mainly due to the entry
of new firms. These previous papers primarily use reduced-form approach. With a general
equilibrium setting, we complement the literature by quantifying the role of new firms in-
duced by trade barrier reductions in explaining the export growth. A recent working paper
by Brandt and Lim (2019) also accounts for China’s export growth. Our approach differs from
theirs in two main aspects. First, they focus on changes in productivity, demand, and labor
and firm-entry costs between 2000 and 2013, whereas we study migration and tariff barrier
changes. Second, they calibrate their model to analyze evolution of China’s export growth.
We focus on China’s export growth between 1990 and 2005 and use empirical estimates to
discipline the degree of firm adjustments to barrier reductions.5
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents facts to motivate our analysis; Section
3 presents our model; and Section 4 decomposes the aggregate trade elasticity into multiple
margins. Section 5 validates the new-firm and export-regime margins. Section 6 discusses our
data sources and measures policy shocks. Section 7 presents the quantitative results, and
Section 8 concludes.
2 Motivating Facts
We describe the magnitude of the tariff changes we analyze. We also present facts to motivate
the importance of internal migration in manufacturing employment and the importance of
the growing number of firms and their potential contribution to China’s export growth.
There has been a dramatic decline in the world’s Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariffs
since the Uruguay Round in 1991 (Caliendo, Feenstra, Romalis and Taylor, 2015). As China
joined the WTO and gained the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status in foreign countries, the
5We choose the time window between 1990 and 2005 because of data availability.
5
data show a decline in tariffs levied by foreign countries on China’s exports between 1990
and 2005 (see Appendix Figure 10).6 The decline in China’s import tariffs was even more
prominent, which on average declined from over 40% to less than 10%. Substantial hetero-
geneity emerged in import tariff reductions across sectors (see Appendix Figure 11). China’s
import tariff reductions were only applied to ordinary producers, whereas processing firms
had enjoyed duty-free imported intermediate materials since 1987. Therefore, we distinguish
Chinese firms by processing and ordinary export regimes in the model.
2.1 Migrants’ Employment and Manufacturing Exports
We define migrants as individuals whose Hukou is not registered in the province where they
are currently working. We measure migrants’ employment shares using micro-level data
from the 2005 Population Census. The left-hand panel of Figure 1 presents cross-sectional
data in 2005 on the share of inter-provincial migrants in total manufacturing employment
against manufacturing export-output ratios for each province. It is evident that provinces
where migrants comprised larger portions of manufacturing employment were more export-
oriented and accounted for higher shares of national exports (export volumes are reflected
by circle size). Two noteworthy provinces are Guangdong and Shanghai, where migrants
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Figure 1: Migrants’ Manufacturing Employment Shares against Provincial Export-Output
Ratios (left-hand); Migrants’ Sectoral Employment Shares against Processing Export Shares
across Manufacturing Sectors—Guangdong Province (right-hand)
Notes: The circle size of the left-hand panel measures provincial export volume. The circle size of the right-hand panel reflects
provincial processing export volume in each sector. Sectors are labelled using International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)
Revision 3 codes (see Appendix Table 8). Fitted lines from an export-weighted regression (in blue) and an unweighted regression
(in green) confirm a strong positive correlation.
6There have also been significant declines in non-tariff trade barriers, which are not captured by the tariff
data. Examples are the reduction in uncertainty as China gained permanent MFN status (Handley and Limão,
2017), and the elimination of export intermediaries (Bai, Krishna and Ma, 2017).
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While yearly data on the provincial level of internal migration and export growth are
difficult to obtain, Appendix B provides additional evidence for the timing of provincial
migration and exports at three time points, 1990, 2000, and 2005. We find evidence that the
massive migration to coastal provinces started no later than the surge in Chinese exports. The
timing suggests agglomeration economies at coastal provinces arose from internal migration.
We model these agglomeration forces as external economies of scale (Ethier, 1982), where the
provincial and sectoral TFP increases with their employment.
The right-hand panel plots migrants’ sectoral employment shares (x-axis) against the
share of processing exports in total sectoral exports (y-axis) in Guangdong Province. Mi-
grants’ employment shares were higher in processing-oriented manufacturing sectors than
in sectors that were less concentrated in processing exports.
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Figure 2: Provincial Annual Growth of Exports and the Number of Firms
Notes: The number of firms in 1990 and 2005 are obtained from the Industrial Statistical Yearbook and the Firm Census, respec-
tively. We use the 2004 Firm Census to measure the number of firms in 2005, as it provides full coverage of manufacturing firms.
Figure 2 plots annual export growth against annual growth rates of the number of manu-
facturing firms for each province between 1990 and 2005. It shows that provinces where the
number of manufacturing firms expanded faster also experienced stronger export growth.
Although rapid increases in the number of firms are partially due to reduced barriers to
firm entry, reductions in tariffs and migration barriers also lead to the emergence of new
firms.7 Therefore, reductions in tariffs or migration barriers affect aggregate exports not only
through the intensive and extensive margins of trade, as in Chaney (2008), but also by attracting
more firms to locate in China and driving firms to switch between processing and ordinary
7This fact is consistent with the recent finding in Khandelwal et al. (2013), where trade liberalization led to a
rapid expansion in the number of China’s manufacturing firms.
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regimes.8 Motivated by this, we build firm sorting across locations and across regimes into a
Melitz-Chaney model.
3 A Spatial Equilibrium Model with Firms’ Location Choices
We build a multi-sector spatial general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms’ and
workers’ location choices. The world has a total number Ms of potential intermediate-good
producers (firms) in each sector s.9 We treat each foreign country as a single region. In China,
we consider provinces as regions, and in each province we further consider processing and
ordinary export regimes. Firms decide in which country to produce and whether to export; if
located in China, firms also choose a combination of province and export regime.10 In China,
workers are imperfectly mobile across provinces and sectors, but are perfectly mobile be-
tween processing and ordinary firms within each province-sector pair. In foreign countries,
we simply assume that workers are perfectly mobile across sectors.
We use index l(m) to denote a combination of province l and export regime m ∈ {O,P},
where O and P denote ordinary and processing regimes respectively. We use j or n to index
foreign countries. For ease of description, we mostly present our model based on China’s
provinces and export regimes. We discuss the setup for foreign countries when a distinction
arises. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
3.1 Final-good Producers


















where qj,l(m),s(ω) is the quantity of intermediate goods ω shipped from foreign country j to
l(m), and ql′(O),l(m),s(ω) is the quantity sourced from domestic ordinary producers in province
l′. Since processing producers must sell their output overseas, the summation combines
8Because processing and ordinary producers face differential tariff treatments, China’s reductions in import
tariffs affect aggregate exports by causing firms to switch between processing and ordinary regimes. Also note
that migrants’ sectoral employment shares differ between processing- and ordinary-oriented sectors. Therefore,
reductions in migration barriers would differentially affect processing and ordinary producers and cause firms
to switch between these two export regimes.
9Idea-based growth literature (e.g., Jones, 1995; Kortum, 1997) typically assumes that the total number of
ideas scales with population. In our model, the population is constant in the quantitative analysis, and therefore
we assume that the number of potential producers is constant.
10We do not distinguish between export regimes in foreign countries.
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intermediate goods sourced from all foreign countries and domestic ordinary producers in
all China’s provinces. σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The final good
can be either consumed by households or used as raw materials to produce intermediate















Foreign producers can source from processing and ordinary regimes of China. The produc-






































Firms with productivity φl(m),s employ Ll(m),s efficiency units of labor and Ql(m),s,k units of












where λLl(m),s is the share of workers’ value added, and λ
k
l(m),s is the share of expenses on raw




















Two of the three policies we analyze would affect exports directly through the unit cost.
First, decreases in barriers to labor mobility would reduce wages wl(m),s. Second, the decline
in import tariffs would change the price index Pl(m),k for ordinary producers by lowering the
11The unit cost of the input bundle is common to all firms in province l and export regime m.
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prices of imported inputs. However, it has no direct impact on the price index for processing
producers who have faced no import tariffs since 1987.





provinces and regimes, and across foreign countries from a multivariate Pareto distribution










































The parameter ρ captures the correlation of productivity draws between processing and
ordinary regimes, while the parameter γ captures the correlation across locations. Each cor-
relation parameter takes a value between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicating a stronger
correlation. These two correlation parameters govern the new-firm and export-regime margins
of the aggregate trade elasticity, which will be shown in Section 4.
We assume θ > σ − 1. A larger θ corresponds to a smaller productivity dispersion across
the continuum of firms. As the timing of migration and export growth suggests a story of
agglomeration economies (discussed in Section 2.1), we assume Al(m),s = Āl(m),sL
α
l(m),s with α
governing the agglomeration externality.
3.2.2 Firm’s Problem
Firms face fixed marketing costs of exporting and two types of variable trade costs—iceberg
trade costs and ad valorem tariffs following Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014). They solve
a sequential optimization problem. In the first stage, for each destination market n, firms
choose where to locate by minimizing the unit cost of exporting to destination n. In the
second stage, given location and regime choices, firms decide whether to export to destina-
tion n and the optimal price if exporting. We solve the firm’s optimization problem through
backward induction.
Optimal Price: Under monopolistic competition, firms choose the optimal price to maximize



















n,s , where En,s is destination
n’s total expenditure in sector s. The expression, t̃i,n,s = 1 + ti,n,s, incorporates the export
tariff levied by foreign country n on Chinese goods and is constant across all provinces and
regimes. Firms also need to pay fixed marketing costs in terms of input bundles of destina-
tion n, denoted as cn,sfn,s > 0.
12 The optimal price is set with a markup σ
σ−1
over the marginal








Exporting Decisions: Firms will only export from l(m) to destination n if the profit is pos-
itive. Given the demand and the optimal price in equation (3), the zero-profit productivity















In related papers that model firms’ location choices in the spatial equilibrium, Suárez Serrato
and Zidar (2016) and Fajgelbaum, Morales, Serrato and Zidar (2018) assume zero fixed costs.
Here we allow for positive fixed costs, and therefore our model captures firms’ decisions on
whether to export to given markets (the extensive margin of trade).14 Another point to note
from equation (4) is that by modeling revenue tariffs, the zero-profit productivity cutoff is
more responsive to tariff changes than to changes in iceberg costs.
Firm’s Location and Regime Choices: We define a cost-adjusted productivity, which relates





Choosing where to locate by minimizing the unit cost to serve destination n is equivalent










12fn,s is the fixed cost in units of input bundles at destination n. Although our model remains tractable by
considering fn,s to be specific to l and m, we assume that fn,s is the same across l and m. This is because the l
and m components in fixed costs are over-identified and can be absorbed into Al(m),s in our calibration.
13Alternatively, we can also quantify the impact of China’s elimination of trading rights on export growth by
incorporating a commission rate charged by export intermediaries into t̃i,n,s. However, we do not pursue this
exercise as the commission rate is unobserved (Bai et al., 2017).
14Without fixed marketing costs, every firm makes positive profits and exports to every market under mo-
nopolistic competition.
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where Y is a discrete random variable denoting firms’ location and regime choices. We omit
subscript n and s, but we are aware that Y is destination- and sector-specific.
3.2.3 Firm Sorting and the Distribution of Maximum Productivity











According to the maximization problem regarding firms’ location and regime choices, Z is
the equilibrium (cost-adjusted) productivity of all operating firms (after sorting into loca-
tions and regimes). Again, we omit subscript n and s, but we are aware that Z is also




∗ ∀ r, where Z∗ is the lower bound of the support for Z. This restriction ensures
that some firms would not serve market n from everywhere. We focus on Z > Z∗ and obtain
the following proposition.15
Proposition 1. (The Marginal Density of Y and Z)







































. t̃i,n,s and t̃j,n,s include tariffs levied by destination n on China’s and country
j’s exports, respectively.














(c) Y and Z are independent.
Part (a) states that the probability of firms’ location and regime choices is determined by
structural parameters (θ, ρ, and γ), firm-level TFP, trade costs, and production costs. Part




φj,n,s. As firms with
Z∗ are not actively operating, we do not consider them in the analysis.
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(b) states that in each sector, the maximum of cost-adjusted productivity follows a univari-
ate Pareto distribution. The scale parameter is captured by firms’ market access to destina-
tion market n. Part (c) states that Y and Z are independent, implying that the distribution
for the maximum of cost-adjusted productivity conditional on choosing each l(m) or j still
has the density defined in equation (8).16 As a result, conditional on being located in l(m),
the unadjusted productivity, which differs from the cost-adjusted productivity by a scale
cl(m),sdl(m),n,st̃i,n,s, also follows a Pareto distribution.
Corollary. The unadjusted productivity for firms choosing r has a Pareto CDF function Gφ|r ≡
P
(


















So far we have shown that the unadjusted productivity after firm sorting across location
and regimes follows a univariate Pareto distribution. Therefore, we can derive aggregate
trade shares and price indices similarly as in the Melitz-Chaney model, except for two key
differences: (1) we need to keep track of the endogenous number of firms defined in equa-
tions (6) and (7), and (2) the scale parameter of the Pareto distribution is an endogenous
variable that captures changes in market access resulting from firm sorting. The cumulative
distribution function defined in equation (9) allows us to obtain the aggregate trade share
and prices.
3.3 Aggregate Trade Shares and Prices
















Analogously, the share of country n’s expenditure in sector s that is spent on goods produced

















reflects not only the probability of location choices among ex-
porting firms, but also the probability among all firms with Z > Z∗, since the independence property implies
P
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Equation (10) specifies the key factors that determine trade shares. Our counterfactual anal-
ysis quantifies the impact of changes in cl(m),s (resulting from internal migration or import
tariff changes) and changes in export tariffs on China’s export surge. We attribute the resid-
ual of export growth to Al(m),s and non-tariff trade costs dl(m),n,s.
Another noteworthy point is that as a macro-level consequence of modelling revenue tar-
iffs, the changes in export tariffs have an additional impact on aggregate trade, which is
captured by ϑ = σ−1−θ
σ−1
, rather than entering symmetrically into iceberg trade costs. We also



































3.4 Workers’ Preferences and Labor Markets




s , with βs > 0 denoted as
the expenditure share on the final good produced by sector s and
∑
s βs = 1.
Chinese Labor Markets: Chinese workers are grouped based on the province of their Hukou
registration, and we index group by g. Workers sort into provinces and sectors based on their
idiosyncratic location preferences, following Tombe and Zhu (2019). Within each province
and sector, workers are perfectly mobile between processing and ordinary firms, wl,s =
wl(P),s = wl(O),s. Each worker supplies one unit of labor.
Specifically, a worker chooses provinces and sectors by maximizing τg,l,s × ag,l,s × Vl,s.
τg,l,s represents migration frictions which act as proportional adjustments to real expendi-
ture.17 Migration frictions are modelled as group-destination-sector-specific because Section
2.1 suggests that there was a large degree of heterogeneity in migrants’ employment shares
across provinces and sectors.18 Preferences over locations ag,l,s are drawn independently




, where a larger
shape parameter κ corresponds to a smaller degree of heterogeneity in location preferences
across workers. Vl,s =
wl,s
Pl
is the real wage per efficiency unit in l and s, where Pl is the
17The assumption that migration costs are proportional adjustments to real expenditure is commonly ex-
ploited in the literature; for example, see Borjas (1987), Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-
hansberg and Sarte (2016), and Galle, Rodriguez-Clare and Yi (2017). One interpretation is that migrants may
enjoy fewer working/leisure hours because of more time spent traveling (Bryan and Morten, 2019).
18In provinces such as Guangdong and Zhejiang, migrants were disproportionately employed in manufac-
turing sectors, whereas in Shanghai and Beijing, migrants were disproportionately employed in the hotel &
restaurant service and retail sectors.
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aggregate price index in province l.19
With Fréchet-distributed location preferences, we obtain the closed-form solution for the











Parameter κ governs the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages. We define
Lg,l,s = LgΛg,l,s as efficiency units of labor provided by group g to province l and sector s.
Foreign Labor Markets: Each foreign country n has a fixed population Ln. We consider a
single labor market in each foreign country, where labor is perfectly mobile across sectors,
and wn denotes the wage rate in country n.
3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
Assuming that profits are spent by managers on input bundles,20 and tariff revenues are
rebated to local workers, the market clearing condition for final goods in Chinese provinces
is:

















where η = θ−σ+1
σθ
is the ratio of marketing costs to net-of-tariff trade flows. The left-hand side
is the value of the final good produced in l(m) and sector s.21 The first term on the right-
hand side is workers’ consumption. Because processing goods cannot be consumed domes-










Πr,l(O),sEl(O),s and Il(P) = 0. The second term sums up the material costs spent
by local establishments and the marketing costs incurred by firms selling to the local market.


































l(m),s}, and the profit ratio relies on structural parameters. As an alternative, we also experiment
with the assumption that profits are spent by managers on consumption goods according to workers’ prefer-
ences. This gives quantitatively similar results, which are available upon request.
21Since the final good is produced using only intermediate goods (either produced domestically or imported),
the value of the final good equals its total expenditure on intermediate goods, El(m),s = Pl(m),sQl(m),s.
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The left-hand side represents both ordinary and processing producers’ expenses on labor.
The right-hand side is the labor income in province l in sector s earned by workers from all
labor groups.
In summary, given model fundamentals and parameters, Chinese provinces and sec-
tors’ endogenous variables {Πl(m),n,s, Pl(m),s,Λg,l,s, El(m),s, wl,s} satisfy conditions (10), (12),
and (13)–(15). The equilibrium conditions for foreign countries can be obtained analogously.
4 Decomposing the Aggregate Trade Elasticity
This section obtains an analytic expression for each of the four margins: the intensive, ex-
tensive, new-firm, and export-regime margins. Again, we develop our argument by considering
exports from l(m) in China to foreign destination n. Recall that the aggregate trade flow from
l(m) to n in sector s is








where xl(m),n,s(φ) denotes the sales from l(m) to n in sector s by firms with productivity
level φ. φ∗ is the zero-profit productivity cutoff defined in equation (4).22 Gφ|l(m) is given in
equation (9), which represents the equilibrium productivity distribution among firms that
choose l(m). The gravity equation (16) resembles the one in a Melitz-Chaney model, except




choosing location l(m) to serve n is
endogenous, and (2) the scale parameter of the unadjusted productivity distribution defined




















where Gφ = 1 − φ




































Export-regime and New-firm Margins
In our model, firms first choose a location and an export regime, and then decide whether
to export and the optimal volume of exports. The first two terms on the right-hand side
reflect the intensive and extensive margins of firm adjustments respectively, given that firms
have chosen l(m). In the third term, the derivative ∂R
∂dl(m),n,s
captures the consequences of firm
sorting. We break down the third term into the new-firm and export-regime margins and obtain


































where Ml,s is the number of firms choosing province l in sector s, and Ml(m),s is the number
of firms choosing province l and regime m in sector s. Three comments are in order. First,
despite an endogenous number of firms, the intensive and extensive margins in our model have
the exact formula as in Chaney (2008). This implies identical intensive and extensive margins
of trade among incumbents and entrants. This result is due to the independence between
location choice Y and productivity Z: after firms choose their locations and regimes, the
shape parameter of the productivity distribution among firms located in l(m), captured by θ,
is unchanged.
Second, the new-firm margin increases with γ, and the export-regime margin increases with
ρ. Since γ and ρ take values between 0 and 1, the new-firm margin and export-regime margin can
take any arbitrary non-negative values which offer flexibility to match the empirical regular-
ity. 23 Third, equation (17) guides our parameter restrictions to decompose China’s aggregate
export growth into four different margins of adjustments using a general equilibrium model.













take values between 0 and 1.
24Our counterfactual experiments that involve internal migration shocks or import tariff reductions would
affect firms’ costs of production, cl(m),s. Since cl(m),s and dl(m),n,s are symmetric in our gravity equation, the
decomposition results in equation (17) can be applied to analyze these two shocks. Since export tariffs have an
asymmetric effect from iceberg costs, export tariffs have an additional elasticity captured by ϑ.
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5 Empirical Analysis
We provide empirical validation for the new-firm and export-regime margins of firm adjust-
ments in our data. In Section 5.1, we validate the new-firm margin by estimating the impact
of an increase in the supply of migrant workers on the number of firms across provinces and
sectors between 1990 and 2005. In Section 5.2, we explore cross-sectoral variation to validate
the export-regime margin by estimating the impact of changes in production costs (induced by
import tariff changes) on the relative number of ordinary to processing exporters. Section 5.3
uses the reduced-form estimates to discipline the values of the structural parameters ρ and
γ, using an indirect inference procedure.
5.1 Internal Migration and Firms’ Location Choice
We estimate the following reduced-form regression:
∆Ml,s = β0 + β1∆N
m
l,s + γxl,s + ǫl,s. (18)
The dependent variable is the growth in the total number of firms (processing and ordinary)










where Ml,s,t is the number of firms in province l and sector s at year t. This way of defin-
ing growth follows from Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and allows growth rates to lie in
the closed interval [−2, 2], which avoids extreme values. We obtain the number of firms in
1990 and 2005 from the Industrial Statistical Yearbook and the Firm Census, respectively.
We cluster industries to 16 aggregated manufacturing sectors (see Table 8). The independent
variable is the changes in the migrant share in province l and sector s between 1990 and 2005,













. Here Nml,s,t and Nl,s,t are the
number of migrant workers and the total number of workers in province l and sector s at
year t, respectively. We obtain these variables from China’s Population Census in 1990 and
2005. xl,s is the province and sector control variables.
The OLS regression in equation (18) tends to be biased because an unobserved local pro-
ductivity or policy shock could attract more firms and migrant workers. To deal with this





∆N−l,−sg × Λg,l,s,t0 , (19)
where ∆N−l,−sg is the change in the total number of group g migrants between 1990 and 2005,
excluding those who migrated to province l and sector s, g denotes the province of Hukou
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Table 1: The Impact of Internal Migration on the Number of Firms
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var: Growth in Num of Firms, 90–05
∆migrant share 1.018*** 0.987*** 0.957*** 0.750***
(0.225) (0.327) (0.274) (0.182)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No Yes
First-stage F 76.42 58.29 63.24
Obs 420 420 420 420
R-squared 0.233 0.232 0.457 0.544
Notes: This table presents the results from estimating regression (18) across provinces and sectors. The instrument is the Card-type
instrument to predict exogenous labor supply shifts, as specified in the main text. The controls include: 1) log average output per
worker in 1990; 2) changes in non-tariff barriers, FDI restrictions, and input and output tariffs between 1990 and 2005, from Brandt
et al. (2017). Regressions are weighted by firm numbers in each province-sector pair in 1990. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and clustered by province. Significance levels: 10% * 5% ** 1% ***.
registration, and Λg,l,s,t0 is the share of group-g workers choosing province l and sector s in
the year t0 among those who migrated.
25 We find that the instrument ∆Ñml,s strongly predicts
the actual migration pattern ∆Nml,s, with the coefficient of 0.525 and the standard error of
0.046.26 Table 1 also reports that the first-stage F values are larger than 10 for all cases.
Recent papers by Adao, Kolesár and Morales (2019) and Borusyak, Hull and Jaravel
(2018) study the identification of shift-share instrumentals in the form of equation (19) which
can be obtained if either the shifts or the shares are randomly assigned. In our case, the iden-
tification holds if N−l,−sg or Λg,l,s,t0 is orthogonal to the initial province-sector productivity in
year 1990. The orthogonality between N−l,−sg and the initial province-sector productivity is
likely to hold because each province-sector cell we consider is small which means that it has
little power in driving national-level migration pattern in aggregate.27
Column (1) of Table 1 presents the estimate based on the OLS regression. We find a strong
and positive association: provinces and sectors that experienced faster growth in the number
of migrants also experienced a rapid growth in the number of firms. The IV regression in Col-
umn (2) reports a slightly lower β1 estimate than the OLS result. The upward bias in the OLS
regression likely reflects that fast-growing regions or sectors attracted more migrants and
firms. Column (3) shows that our IV estimate is robust to adding control variables including:
1) log average output per worker in 1990; 2) changes in non-tariff barriers, FDI restrictions,
and input and output tariffs between 1990 and 2005. Column (4) further controls for sector
25We use the 1990 Population Census to measure internal migration in the initial year, using workers’ current
province of residence and province of residence in the year 1985.
26For all regressions results, we cluster standard errors by province.
27Despite coastal provinces being the major destinations of internal migrants, each specific coastal province
and sector cell is small in accounting for the overall migrants as we consider 30 provinces and 29 sectors.
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fixed effects,28 and the within-sector variation delivers a smaller estimate.
5.2 Import Tariffs and Firms’ Export-Regime Choices
Because imported materials for processing exports are duty-free, we expect ordinary ex-
porters to benefit more from import tariff reductions due to China’s WTO accession com-
pared to processing exporters. Thus, we estimate the following reduced-form regression:









+ γxl,s + ǫl,s, (20)
where the dependent variable is the changes in the number of exporters in province l and sec-










separately for ordinary and processing regimes m ∈ {O,P}. We obtain the number of pro-
cessing and ordinary exporters across provinces and manufacturing sectors by linking the
China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms with Customs Database for 2000 and 2005.29
The independent variable measures province-sector-level changes in production costs re-
sulting from import tariff reductions. IP l,k is the share of imports in the total expenditure







< 0 captures changes in import costs due to tariff reductions. The tariffs
are drawn from the UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS).31 λkl,s is
the share of sector s’s production costs spent on materials from sector k, obtained from the
input-output tables in 2005. In our independent variable, reductions in production costs
were larger if the province intensively used foreign inputs (high IP l,k) or that sector inten-
sively used materials that had large tariff reductions (high λkl,s or low
1+tk,2005
1+tk,2000
). 1O is a dummy
variable for ordinary exporters. The parameter of interest is β2, with β2 < 0 capturing that or-
dinary exporters would benefit more from tariff reductions relative to processing exporters.
Tariff changes between 2000 and 2005 may have been endogenous, as policymakers could
change import tariffs selectively in favor of less competitive domestic industries. We con-
struct an instrument for the changes in applied tariffs by using the maximum tariff levels
28We do not control province fixed effects because changes in the migrant share mainly came from between-
province variation, as a result of different Hukou policies (Kinnan, Wang and Wang, 2018).
29We follow Yu (2015) and Dai, Maitra and Yu (2016) to match these two datasets. The match is based on
variables such as firm name, telephone number, and zip code. We compute the number of ordinary (processing)
exporters as the total number of firms that perform ordinary (processing) exports, weighted by the share of
ordinary (processing) exports in their sales.
30We compute import shares using the trade matrix in 2005.
31The raw data on tariffs are based on 6-digit HS products from each origin country to China. We use the
trade volume as weights to aggregate China’s import tariffs into our 16 manufacturing sectors (Table 8).
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Table 2: The Impact of WTO on the Number of Ordinary and Processing Exporters
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var: Growth in Num of Firms, 00–05
∆costs due to import tariffs
-0.619 -1.545 3.127 -8.719**
(9.118) (9.617) (9.577) (3.766)
∆costs due to import tariffs
× 1{ordinary exporters}
-13.517 -12.741 -18.211** -18.928*
(10.383) (9.945) (7.829) (9.857)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes
First-stage F 2126.46 3423.86 1901.03
Obs 751 751 751 751
R-squared 0.354 0.354 0.426 0.664
Notes: This table presents the results from estimating regression (20) across provinces, sectors and export regimes. All regressions
include a dummy variable for export regimes. The instruments are the change in maximum tariffs (as specified in the main text)
and its interaction with the ordinary regime. The controls include: 1) changes in non-tariff barriers, FDI restrictions, and output
tariffs between 2000 and 2005, from Brandt et al. (2017); 2) initial openness levels measured by the ratio of exports to output in
2000. Regressions are weighted by firm numbers in each province-sector-regime pair in 2000. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and clustered by province. Significance levels: 10% * 5% ** 1% ***.











where tWTOk,2000 and t
WTO
k,2005 refer to specified maximum tariff levels in the WTO agreement, which
were mostly agreed in 1999. This instrument is relevant because the agreed tariff rates
strongly predict the actual rates. We find that this instrument strongly predicts actual pro-
duction cost changes due to tariff reductions, with the coefficient of 1.161 and the standard
error of 0.038. In Table 2, we also show that the first-stage F values are sizable.
The exclusion restrictions of this instrument require two premises: 1) the actual tariffs
deviate from the agreed rates which we do observe in the data, and 2) the agreed maximum
tariff rates are uncorrelated with ǫl,s, the unobserved future factors that affect the relative
provincial-sector number of ordinary and processing firms. For 2) to hold, there needs to be
the likely policy and economic uncertainties in each province l and sector s so that policy-
makers’ anticipation on ǫl,s is not formed by the agreed maximum tariff rates.
32
Our OLS and IV regressions in Columns (1)–(2) of Table 2 find that, for sectors that en-
joyed larger cost reductions after WTO, the number of ordinary exporters grew faster relative
32As mentioned in Brandt et al. (2017), this instrument cannot address the endogeneity problem if the pol-
icymakers can correctly anticipate ǫl,s. Moreover, in line with Brandt et al. (2017), we also find suggestive
evidence that the tariff cut is less likely to be driven by the past firm or industry performance: our instrument
is uncorrelated with the number of processing and ordinary exporters across provinces, industries in the past.
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to the number of processing exporters. Column (3) also controls for: 1) changes in non-tariff
barriers, FDI restrictions, and output tariffs between 2000 and 2005; and 2) initial openness
levels measured by the ratio of exports to output in 2000. After including controls, the results
are quantitatively similar and become statistically significant. Column (4) further controls for
province fixed effects, and the within-province variation delivers a similar estimate.
5.3 Linking Reduced-Form Estimates to Structural Productivity Correlation Parameters
We use an indirect inference approach (Gouriéroux and Monfort, 1996) to jointly search struc-
tural parameters ρ and γ to target our reduced-form estimates in Column (3) of Tables 1 and
2. We provide the details of the procedure in Appendix D.
(a) Estimate of β1 in in Regression (18) (b) Estimate of b2 in Regression (20)
Figure 3: Estimates from Migration and Tariff Regressions using Model-Generated Data
This graph replicates Column (3) of Tables 1 and 2. The left-hand figure varies γ from 0 to 0.85 in the counterfactual exercise with changes
in migration barriers, holding all other parameters at their baseline levels. The vertical line represents the value of γ = 0.63, in which the
estimate produced by the model-generated data (0.95) matches the estimate in Column (3) of Table 1. The right-hand figure varies ρ from
0 to 0.9 in the counterfactual exercise with changes in import tariffs, holding all other parameters at their baseline levels. The vertical line
represents the baseline value of ρ = 0.81, in which the estimate produced by the model-generated data (-17.8) matches the estimate in
Column (3) of Table 2.
Figure 3 plots the one-dimensional relationship between the reduced-form estimates (us-
ing model-generated data) and the structural parameters, namely β1 and γ on the left-hand
panel and b2 and ρ on the right-hand panel. Both panels show a monotonic relationship
which corroborates the trade elasticity decomposition given in equation (17): a higher γ
corresponds to greater firms’ location adjustments when a province-sector receives more
migrants; and a higher ρ indicates that firms switch more towards ordinary regime when
import tariffs decrease. Our indirect inference approach yields estimates of γ = 0.63 and
ρ = 0.81, both of which are comparable to those in the previous literature.33
33Brandt et al. (2018) find the correlation of productivity draws between export regimes to be 0.71. ARRY
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We show further evidence that each structural parameter is indeed identified from the
related margins of firm adjustments discussed in Section 4, i.e., the new-firm margin for γ
and the export-regime margin for ρ. Figure 4 plots the structural parameters ρ and γ on the
horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. The value of each contour line, in the left-hand
panel, is the reduced-form estimate of firm responses to migration, and in the right-hand
panel, is the reduced-form estimate on the responses of the relative number of ordinary to
processing exporters to the import tariff reductions. All reduced-form estimates are based
on model-generated data. The pattern in the left-hand panel shows that the reduced-form
estimate on firm responses to migration is only responsive to γ but not to ρ. We find an
opposite pattern on the right-hand panel—the estimate on the relative number of exporters
is mostly responsive to ρ but not to γ.
(a) Estimate of β1 in Regression (18) (b) Estimate of b2 in Regression (20)
Figure 4: Estimates from Migration and Tariff Regressions using Model-Generated Data
6 Quantitative Analysis
China’s manufacturing exports increased by a factor of 11.8 in real terms between 1990
and 2005, equaling an annual growth rate of 17.8%. The growth rate was faster in coastal
provinces (see Appendix Figure 12). We decompose this observed export increase into four
sources including: 1) changes in the costs of intermediate inputs due to import tariff changes;
2) changes in export tariffs; 3) changes in labor costs (wl(m),s) due to internal migration; and
4) the composite of changes in TFP (Āl(m),s) and iceberg trade costs (dl(m),n,s), which we match
to the residual of the observed export increase.
We calibrate our model to 29 sectors, 30 Chinese provinces, 35 foreign countries and a
find the correlation of productivity draws across countries to be 0.55.
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constructed rest of the world. Our 29 sector categories are aggregated based on the 2-digit
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev 3), including 16 tradable sectors
and 13 non-tradable sectors. We express the equilibrium system in proportional changes (see
Appendix A.6) and solve the model using the “Exact Hat Algebra” approach. Noting that the
Exact Hat Algebra approach can compare between any two equilibria, we match our model
to the year 2005, for which we have high-quality data to measure provincial imports from
and exports to foreign countries.34 Our counterfactual exercise is to quantify what the level
of China’s exports in 2005 would be if the tariffs and migration frictions were to stay at the
level in 1990.




r,s}, we introduce China’s import and
export tariff changes, and changes in migration frictions into the model, individually. We set
̂̄Ar,s = f̂n,s = M̂s = d̂r,n,s = L̂g = L̂n = 1 and solve {Π̂l(m),n,s, Π̂j,n,s, P̂r,s, Λ̂g,l,s, Êr,s, ŵl,s, ŵn}
from the system of equations in changes, r ∈ {l(m), j}. We treat the U.S. GDP as the nu-
meraire, and trade is balanced for all counterfactual exercises.35 In the rest of this section, we
discuss the data sources, measurement of three policy shocks, and other model parameters.
6.1 Data
Our counterfactual exercises require data on: intranational and international trade flows;
firms’ location probability {
Ml(m),s
Ms
}; inter-provincial migration rates {Λg,l,s}; sectoral output
{Xr,s}; and labor income in both China {wl,sLg,l,s} and foreign countries {wnLn}. We sum-
marize the data sources we use below and provide detailed descriptions in Appendix C.
Provincial Imports and Exports by Sectors and Regimes: China’s Customs Transactions
Database has information on whether a firm is engaged in exporting processing activities.
We aggregate firms’ transaction-level import and export volume to the provincial level by
processing and ordinary regimes and by 29 sectors. We thus obtain trade flows between
China’s provinces and foreign countries by processing and ordinary regimes in the year 2005.
Provincial Gross Output by Sectors and Regimes: Since processing production is not al-
lowed to be sold domestically, we use the total amount of processing exports from China’s
Customs Transactions Database to measure processing output. We then measure province-
sector gross output from input-output tables in the year 2007 (the closest available year to
2005), and deflate output using the growth rate of China’s sectoral output between 2005 to
34Previous papers mostly calibrate models to the initial year (e.g., Caliendo and Parro, 2015, among others).
See Adao, Costinot and Donaldson (2017) who calibrated their model to the final year of their study. The
interpretation of the counterfactual results differs by the choice of the year used to calibrate the model.
35Instead of assuming balanced trade, an alternative approach is to assume the aggregate trade deficit as a
fixed share of the world GDP (Caliendo and Parro, 2015).
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2007. The difference between gross output and the overall processing exports (which also
equal processing output) reflects the gross output in ordinary production.36
Inter-provincial Trade Flows by Sectors and Regimes: Again, since processing production
is not allowed to be sold domestically, sectoral inter-provincial trade flows from regional
input-output tables reflect domestic sales from ordinary producers. We compute the amount
of domestic sales to processing producers at each destination and sector, by using data from
input-output tables, processing exports, and processing imports. The rest of domestic sales
are sold to ordinary final-good producers. We further assume that processing and ordinary
final-good producers at each destination and sector have identical expenditure shares on
goods from each domestic origin.37 This assumption allows us to construct trade flows be-
tween province-regime-sectors.
Trade Flows Between Foreign Countries and the Allocation of Firms: We measure bilateral
trade flows between foreign countries using the STAN Bilateral Trade Database and mea-
sure sectoral gross output of each foreign country using OECD Input-Output Database. We
also measure imports from the rest of the world by subtracting the imports from each coun-
try that we consider from the total import volume from the world.38 For the distribution
of firms, we obtain firms’ choice probability according to equilibrium conditions on firms’
choice probability and trade shares given in equations (6) – (11).
Labor Market Variables: We use the 2005 Chinese Population Survey to measure China’s
internal migration flows, wages, and sectoral employment. For the year 2005, we define
China’s internal migrants as those who work in a province other than the place of their
Hukou registration. Since the variable on the province of Hukou registration is unavailable
in the 1990 data, we define a worker as a migrant if their province of residence 5 years
ago differs from their current province of residence.39 We have a total of 30 groups defined
by province of origin and measure the migration stock for each origin-destination-sector
pair. We consider one aggregate labor group for each foreign country, and extract data from
the IPUMS–International and Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to measure employment and
36China’s regional input-output tables in 2007 are obtained from Liu, Chen, Tang, Liu, Han and Li (2012). We
match the 2-digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification Code (CSIC) used in China’s regional input-output
tables with the 2-digit ISIC code, using the concordance in Dean and Lovely (2010).
37This is because we do not have details on whether each trade flow (from an origin) is sold to ordinary or
processing producers in the destination. The assumption of proportionality is typical in the trade literature
(e.g., Johnson and Noguera, 2016).
38Similarly, we measure exports to the rest of the world by subtracting the exports to each country that we
consider from the total export volume to the world.
39Given that internal migration was under strict control before 1990, respondents’ province of residence in
1985 tended to be their home province. Moving out of the Hukou area was initially tightly controlled by the
government. According to China’s 1982 Population Census, only 0.6% of China’s total population in 1982
resided out of their Hukou county.
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wages in foreign countries.
6.2 Measuring Policy Shocks
Measuring Import and Export Tariff Changes: We obtain China’s nominal import tariff
rates and export tariff rates levied by each country in 1990 and 2005 at each sector, from the
UNCTAD TRAINS database.40 We use the trade volume as weights to aggregate the reported
tariffs based on 6-digit HS products into our 29 sector categories. We apply changes in export
tariffs between 1990 and 2005 to both processing and ordinary firms and apply changes in
import tariffs only to ordinary firms. We keep the tariff structure between foreign countries
unchanged. Therefore, our accounting exercises are only based on the realized China-related
tariff structure changes.
Calibrating Migration Friction Changes: Following exactly from Tombe and Zhu (2019), we










The calculation assumes that the costs of staying in home province (denoted as lg) remain
unchanged, and we measure V̂l,s as changes in province-sector real wages from the China
Labor Statistical Yearbook. Calibrating migration costs requires a value of migration elastic-
ity. We assign κ = 1.5 following Tombe and Zhu (2019).41 Using the calibrated migration cost
changes, we present the migrant-population-weighted average over all origin provinces, for
the aggregate manufacturing sector in Appendix Figure 13 and for all sectors in Appendix
Figure 14. Unsurprisingly, the migration costs were reduced more if the destinations were
the coastal provinces and major cities, such as Beijing, but reduced less if the destinations
were inland provinces.
The calibrated change in migration costs reflects several sources. First, it picks up the
changes in the institutional barriers (Hukou system) on labor mobility in China. China assigns
a Hukou to each household to regulate the geographic area in which a Chinese citizen is
eligible to reside, work, and obtain public benefits. Moving out of the Hukou area was initially
tightly controlled by the government and the regulation began to relax in the 1980s. The
effect of the Hukou reform was more dramatic in coastal destinations and major cities (Tombe
40When the data are missing in the year 1990 or 2005, we use the data in the nearest available year to supple-
ment the missing value.
41In an earlier version of this paper, we estimate κ by relating changes in migration shares of each origin-
destination-sector pair between 1990 and 2005 to changes in wage rates. To address workers’ non-random
location and sector choices, we construct a model-based instrument following Allen, Arkolakis and Takahashi
(2014) and Adao, Arkolakis and Esposito (2018). We find a value of κ around 2.8.
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and Zhu, 2019), which is consistent with our calculation where the migration costs changed
more for coastal destinations. Until 2003, many cities had eliminated the requirement for
temporary residence certificates, but migrants were still denied most of the access to social
welfare in the destination city. Second, the emergence of China’s railway has significantly
reduced travel costs, and our calibrated cost changes also capture the changes in travel costs.
6.3 Other Parameter Values
There are nine additional sets of parameter values we need to calibrate to solve the model.
We calculate βs, the share of income spent on sector s, as the ratio of total consumption on
goods from sector s across all countries and provinces to the world total income. We match
the 2005 China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) with the 2005 Customs Database
to compute sectoral value added shares λLl(m),s for processing and ordinary firms. We draw
cost shares of inputs λkl(m),s from China’s input-output tables, and rescale value added shares
for processing and ordinary firms such that the export-weighted average of value added
shares in each sector matches the one in the input-output tables. We obtain foreign countries’
value added shares λLn,s and cost shares of intermediate inputs λ
k
n,s from OECD input-output
tables.42 We summarize the values and sources of other parameters in Table 3.
Table 3: Other Parameter Values
Parameter Definition Source Value
σ Elasticity of substitution across varieties Head and Mayer (2014) 4
θ Trade elasticity Simonovska and Waugh (2014) 4
λLl(m),s Value added share (China) ASIF, Customs, China I/O Table
λkl(m),s Intermediate input share (China) ASIF, Customs, China I/O Table
λLn,s Value added share (foreign) OECD I/O Table
λkn,s Intermediate input share (foreign) OECD I/O Table
βs Sector consumption share OECD I/O Table
α Agglomeration elasticity Combes and Gobillon (2015) 0.05
κ Labor supply elasticity Tombe and Zhu (2019) 1.5
6.4 Model Fit
Before taking our model to perform counterfactual exercises, we compare our model-predicted
changes in province-sector employment by processing and ordinary regimes to those in the
42We calculate λkn,s as the ratio of intermediate inputs from sector k to total output in sector s for each country,






data. We introduce the changes in China’s export and import tariffs between 2000 and 2005
into our model and calculate the changes in employment resulting from the tariff changes.
Using the merged ASIF-Customs data for 2000 and 2005, we measure the actual changes in
the overall province-sector employment by processing and ordinary exporters.43
Table 4 reports the regression results of the model-generated and actual changes in province-
sector employment on tariff changes separately by processing and ordinary exporters. Al-
though all coefficients only reflect the raw correlation between tariff and employment changes,
we take the similarity between the model and the data as suggestive evidence that our model
is able to capture the heterogeneity in province-sector employment changes.






data model data model
Panel A: import tariff changes between 2000–2005
import tariff changes -1.680* -2.133*** -3.971*** -3.311***
(0.854) (0.346) (1.397) (0.548)
Obs 380 380 306 299
R-squared 0.012 0.113 0.044 0.111
Panel B: export tariff changes between 2000–2005
export tariff changes -7.054*** -10.375*** -10.403** -11.788***
(2.530) (0.425) (3.990) (0.884)
Obs 380 380 306 299
R-squared 0.012 0.243 0.029 0.137
Notes: Changes in tariffs are defined as
1+tk,2005
1+tk,2000
, where tk,t is the tariff rate at time t for sector k. As changes in export tariffs
are destination-specific, we use the average change of export tariffs across all destination markets as independent variables in the
regression. Changes in employment are defined following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). We perform the regressions across 30
provinces and 16 manufacturing sectors. Regressions are weighted by the initial employment size in year 2000. Standard errors
are in parenthesis and clustered by province. Significance levels: 10% * 5% ** 1% ***.
7 Quantitative Effects of Trade and Migration Policies in China
We first show the extent to which each policy promoted China’s export surge between 1990
and 2005. After that, we decompose the impact of the policies into four different margins
of trade, and we present the quantitative results on how each policy affected the number of
China’s exporting firms. Finally, we show that our model predictions align with empirical
43We compute firms’ ordinary (processing) employment using their total employment and the share of ordi-
nary (processing) exports in their total sales.
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evidence on firm relocation. Appendix E presents additional quantitative results using an
alternative model with firm entry.
7.1 China’s Export Surge
We introduce the three measured policy changes (tariffs on imports, tariffs on exports, and
internal migration barriers) to our model individually and attribute the residual of the ob-
served export growth to changes in Āl(m),s and dl(m),n,s.
Aggregate Impact on Exports: Panel A of Table 5 shows the impact of each shock on annual
export growth rates in percentage points. The last column shows the average annual growth
rate between 1990–2005. On the national level, reductions in migration barriers led to a 1.29
p.p. increase in annual export growth rate and accounted for 1.29
17.8
≈ 7.2% of the overall export
growth during this period. Reductions in import tariffs caused a 2.30 p.p. increase in annual
export growth rate and accounted for 2.30
17.8
≈ 12.9% of the overall export growth. Changes in
export tariffs resulted in a 1.48 p.p. increase in annual export growth rate and accounted for
1.48
17.8
≈ 8.3% of the overall export growth. 12.73
17.8
≈ 71.5% of China’s export surge was explained
by changes in Āl(m),s and dl(m),n,s.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results for China’s three major exporting provinces, Guang-
dong, Shanghai, and Jiangsu. These three provinces combined accounted for about 70 per-
cent of China’s overall exports in 2005. Reductions in migration barriers led to the most
notable export increases in Guangdong and Shanghai, causing an increase of 4.00 p.p. in an-





≈ 12.8% of the entire export growth between 1990 and 2005 for these two provinces
respectively. These results are consistent with the fact documented in Section 2 that a large
fraction of manufacturing employment in Guangdong and Shanghai were supplied by inter-
nal migrants in 2005.
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Table 5: The Impact of Policies on Annual Export Growth Rates, in Percentage Points
Migration Import Tariff Export Tariff Residual
Annual
Growth Rate
Panel A: Impact on national exports
China 1.29 2.30 1.48 12.73 17.8
Panel B: Impact on provincial exports
Guangdong 4.00 2.34 1.90 8.86 17.1
Shanghai 2.36 1.75 1.26 13.03 18.4
Jiangsu 0.38 1.83 1.63 22.86 26.7
Notes: In each counterfactual, we obtain proportional changes of exports denoted as êxport =
export volume observed in 2005
export volume in counterfactual
. We then







Because provinces differed in their sector composition, the impact of reductions in im-
port and export tariffs varied systematically across provinces in each case. We find that the
impact of changes in import and export tariffs was slightly larger in Guangdong, where these
changes caused an increase of 2.34 + 1.90 = 4.24 p.p. in annual export growth. In Shanghai
and Jiangsu, changes in import and export tariffs led to an increase of 1.75 + 1.26 = 3.01 and
1.83 + 1.63 = 3.46 p.p. in annual export growth respectively.
Processing and Ordinary Exports: We break down China’s export increases by processing
and ordinary regimes and display the results in Table 6. We highlight three findings below.
First, changes in migration barriers had a larger impact on processing exports than on
ordinary exports at the national level. Reductions in migration barriers caused a 1.48 p.p.
increase in annual growth of processing exports, in comparison with a 1.05 p.p. increase in
annual growth of ordinary exports. Although the domestic value added share was higher in
ordinary production than in processing production (Kee and Tang, 2016), the larger impact
on processing exports was primarily driven by the fact that migrants’ employment shares
were much larger in processing-oriented sectors than in sectors that were less concentrated
in export processing. Driven by this fact, we find that reductions in migration barriers had
a larger impact on processing exports than on ordinary exports in Guangdong, in line with
Guangdong’s large migrant employment in processing-oriented sectors (documented in Sec-
tion 2.1). However, in Jiangsu and Shanghai, we find that the impact on ordinary exports
was larger than on processing exports.44
44This result is driven by higher value added shares in ordinary production than in processing production.
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Table 6: The Impact of Policies on Annual Export Growth Rates by Processing and Ordinary
Trade, in Percentage Points
Processing Trade
Share in 2005
Migration Import Tariff Export Tariff
Ordinary Processing Ordinary Processing Ordinary Processing
Panel A: Impact on national exports
China 54.7% 1.05 1.48 2.67 2.03 0.55 2.32
Panel B: Impact on provincial exports
Guangdong 73.5% 3.51 4.20 2.90 2.13 0.38 2.59
Shanghai 57.2% 2.93 2.02 3.26 0.93 0.42 1.89
Jiangsu 66.7% 0.43 0.35 2.55 1.51 0.38 2.35






×100, where êxport is the proportional changes of export volume between
the observed equilibrium and the counterfactual.
Second, import tariff reductions had a larger impact on ordinary exports than on pro-
cessing exports at both the national and provincial levels. This is consistent with the fact that
ordinary production was impacted by reductions in nominal tariffs, whereas the imported
materials for processing exporters were previously duty-free and thus unaffected by these re-
ductions in nominal tariffs. On the national level, import tariff reductions caused a 2.67 p.p
increase in annual growth rate of ordinary exports. Differing from the partial equilibrium
approach in Brandt and Morrow (2017), our general equilibrium approach also predicts a
2.03 p.p. increase in annual growth of processing exports due to reductions in import tariffs.
This difference is due to input-output linkages and equilibrium wage changes in response to
import tariff reductions (similar to Ossa, 2014).
Third, the impact of export tariff reductions operated mostly through promoting process-
ing exports. On the national level, export tariff reductions caused a 2.32 p.p. annual growth
rate of processing exports, in comparison to a 0.55 p.p. annual growth rate of ordinary ex-
ports. We find similar patterns in Guangdong, Shanghai, and Jiangsu. The results are driven
by the fact that relative to ordinary producers, processing producers were more concentrated
in sectors that experienced large export tariff reductions.
7.2 The Margins of Trade
We next break down the impact of each policy into four margins. In Table 3, we introduce
three different sets of parameters for θ, γ, and ρ to isolate the effect of these margins of trade,
while holding all other parameter values at their baseline levels. We calibrate all the versions
of our model to the year 2005. We first set θ ≡ σ − 1 = 3, γ = 0, and ρ = 0 and introduce
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each shock individually. This exercise examines the impact of policies on exports due to the
intensive margin of trade. We then use the second set of parameters of θ = 4, γ = 0 and ρ = 0
and introduce shocks individually. This exercise is used to quantify the intensive and extensive
margins of trade. Note that the results from this exercise are equivalent to the ones predicted
by a multi-sector Melitz-Chaney model with exogenous entry. Comparing the results under
the second set of parameters (θ = 4) with the results under the first set of parameters (θ = 3),
we isolate the extensive margin of trade. We then implement the third set of parameters θ = 4,
ρ = 0.81, and γ = 0. By changing ρ to 0.81 from 0, we isolate the effect of the export-regime
margin. Finally, comparing the results of the third set of counterfactuals with our baseline
results shown in Table 5, we isolate the impact on exports due to the new-firm margin.
For each set of parameters, Table 7 reports the impact of each policy on annual export
growth rates in terms of percentage points. The first three rows report the impact of migra-
tion shocks, import tariff reductions, and export tariff reductions, respectively. The last row
reports the combined impact of all three policies, by simply presenting a sum of the values
in each column. A noteworthy result is that comparing column (3) with column (4), the new-
firm margin of the three policies combined triggered a 5.07− 2.87 ≈ 2.20 p.p. annual increase
in China’s exports and accounted for 2.20
17.8
≈ 12.4% of the overall national export growth. In
other words, holding the number of firms constant in each province, the combined contri-
bution of the three policies to China’s export growth would drop from 28.5% to 16.1%. We
present provincial results in Appendix Table 11.
Table 7: The Impact of Policies on National Annual Export Growth Rates by Different Mar-









Policy Shock θ = 3, γ = 0,
ρ = 0
θ = 4, γ = 0,
ρ = 0
θ = 4, ρ = 0.81,
γ = 0
θ = 4, ρ = 0.81,
γ = 0.63
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration Shock 0.77 0.95 0.91 1.29
Import Tariff 0.87 1.19 1.08 2.30
Export Tariff 0.65 0.83 0.88 1.48
Combined Policies 2.29 2.97 2.87 5.07






×100, where êxport is the proportional changes of export volume between
the observed equilibrium and the counterfactual. Each value in the last row adds up the values of the first three rows along its
column.
Next, in Figure 5, we decompose the impact of each policy on exports into four margins
of trade. On the national level, presented in the upper left-hand Panel, the new-firm margin of
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trade (in red) had a pronounced impact on exports. This margin had the strongest impact in
the case of import tariff reductions and caused a 1.22 p.p. annual increase in China’s export
growth. The migration-induced new-firm margin of trade was the smallest across all three
policies, causing a 0.38 p.p. annual increase in national exports. The small impact of the
new-firm margin resulting from internal migration suggests a strong offsetting effect due to
firms’ switching across provinces.45
For provinces, we find strong effects of the migration-induced new-firm margin in Guang-
dong, causing a 1.55 p.p. increase in annual export growth. The effect of the migration-
induced new-firm margin was also substantial in Shanghai, leading to a 0.55 p.p. increase in
annual export growth. However, we find small effects of the migration-induced new-firm
margin in Jiangsu. As for import tariff reductions, the effects of the new-firm margin were
substantial in all of Guangdong, Shanghai, and Jiangsu, causing a 1.33, 0.80, and 0.93 p.p.
increase in annual export growth, respectively.
7.3 The New-firm Margin
We further explore the extent to which each policy affected the number of exporting firms




, which are the
proportional changes in firm’s probability of choosing China’s provinces and export regimes,
across all foreign destinations and sectors. We plot the impact of migration shocks in green,
the impact of import tariff reductions in blue, and the impact of export tariff reductions in
red. Panels (a) and (b) show firms’ likelihood of choosing ordinary and processing regimes
in Guangdong respectively, while Panels (c) and (d) are for ordinary and processing regimes





One evident feature is that most areas of the histogram are located to the right of the ver-
tical line, indicating that the policy changes attracted more exporting firms into China. We
highlight some findings below. First, in both Guangdong and Shanghai, import tariff reduc-
tions had a stronger impact on attracting ordinary firms than processing firms, as the blue
bars are more skewed to the right in Panels (a) and (c) in comparison with those in Panels (b)
and (d), respectively. Second, reductions in migration barriers substantially attracted firms
to relocate to Guangdong Province, and the impact was strong on both ordinary and pro-
cessing exporters. Import tariff reductions appeared to be important in attracting ordinary
firms to be located in Shanghai. Finally, export tariff changes had a relatively small impact
on attracting firms to relocate to Guangdong and Shanghai. We plot the results for Zhejiang
and Jiangsu provinces in Appendix Table 15.
45We find that provinces which experienced a migration outflow or a relatively small migration inflow suf-
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(d) Jiangsu
Figure 5: The Impact of Policies on Annual Export Growth Rates by Different Margins of
Trade, in Percentage Points
Notes: The intensive margin is obtained from Column (1) of Table 7. The extensive margin is obtained from the difference between
Columns (2) and (1); the export-regime margin is obtained from the difference between Columns (3) and (2), and the new-firm
margin is obtained from the difference between Columns (4) and (3).
7.4 Evidence on Firms’ Relocation
Although China has experienced a dramatic increase in foreign investments and inflows of
production factories over the past 30 years, it is a challenge to distinguish between firm
relocation and entry from our data. This section shows that our model-predicted origins of
new firms align well with the data, which we take as suggestive evidence that our model can
capture variation in the origin of new firms’ majority owner.
We draw data from Chinese Ministry of Commerce to measure the number of new regis-
tered foreign-invested firms. Before 2016, all foreign-invested firms in China were required
to obtain approval for registry and changes of business, and these requests were then pub-
licized on the website. We collect all these raw data and use text analysis to identify infor-
mation on firms’ name, industry, and ownership structure.46 Between 1990 and 2005, there
46We keep manufacturing firms registered between 1990 and 2005 and define foreign-invested firms as firms
with at least 30% foreign ownership. Our results are robust if we use thresholds of 0% or 50% to define foreign
ownership. We do not use 50% as a threshold in the baseline results because for a long time, China requested
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(a) Guangdong Ordinary Exporters (b) Guangdong Processing Exporters
(c) Shanghai Ordinary Exporters (d) Shanghai Processing Exporters
Figure 6: Changes in Firms’ Probability to Choose China’s Provinces and Export Regimes
Notes: The histogram is plotted across all foreign destinations and sectors where China’s export volume was greater than 30




takes very large values




takes values smaller than 3.
were 102,072 new registrations of foreign-invested firms, which is similar to the 91,047 ex-
isting manufacturing foreign-invested firms in the Firm Census 2004.47 Appendix Table 12
presents the number of new foreign-invested firms between 1990 and 2005, ranked by sec-
tors and places of origin. We identify the places of origin by the nationality of firms’ majority
owner.
We use our model to calculate the reduction in number of firms in each foreign region as
a share of the increase in overall number of firms in China resulting from the reduction in
trade and migration barriers. Panel (a) plots the model-predicted shares against the actual
individual firms’ foreign ownership to be lower than 50% in many industries (e.g., automobile industry), espe-
cially before WTO accession.
47Across our 16 manufacturing sectors, the correlation between the number of foreign-invested entrants be-
tween 1990 and 2005 and the number of existing foreign-invested firms in 2004 is 0.95.
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(a) Across Origins (b) Across Sectors
Figure 7: Comparison of Model Predictions with Data on Foreign-invested Firms
share of foreign-invested firms in China by origin between 1990–2005.48 Panel (b) plots the
model-predicted percentage changes in the number of firms by sectors against the observed
changes.49 Both plots show that our model can capture a reasonable amount of heterogeneity
in terms of the origin of foreign firms, as well as at the sector level.
8 Conclusion
This paper quantifies how three policy reforms affected Chinese exports between 1990 and
2005. The rapidly increasing number of firms, which accompanied reductions in Chinese tar-
iffs and internal migration costs, suggests that the entry of new firms induced by reductions
in trade and migration barriers was an important source of China’s export growth. We find
that, together, the three policies explained around 29% of China’s export surge between 1990
and 2005; holding the number of firms unchanged, the portion of Chinese export growth
explained by the three policies combined would drop to 16%. In other words, overlooking
the new-firm margin would cause substantial underestimation on the impact of these policy
changes on China’s export surge.
Differing from the standard Melitz model with endogenous firm entry, our model has
an analytic trade elasticity decomposition for each margin of firm adjustment. While our
empirical analysis validates that both the new-firm and export-regime margins exist in the data,
it is our quantitative exercise and analytic trade elasticity decomposition that allow us to
48We omit Hong Kong in the graph, as it invested hugely in mainland China because of its well-developed
financial markets and shared border.
49We compute the change in firms’ probability to locate in China for each destination-sector, normalized by
the initial probability to locate in China. We use China’s output sold to each destination-sector as weights to ag-
gregate the changes to sectors. The negative change means that the sector experienced relocation of production
from China to overseas resulting from the shocks.
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quantify the extent to which each policy reform impacted aggregate exports through each
margin of firm adjustment. Because of the presence of the new-firm and export-regime margins,
our model predicts a larger trade elasticity in response to trade costs than the standard trade
model. The additional new-firm margin we analyze provides a potential channel to reconcile
the small effects of trade liberalization predicted by standard trade models with the empirical
evidence (e.g., Khandelwal et al., 2013; Feyrer, 2019).
While our paper emphasizes the role played by the new firms in China’s export surge,
our decomposition results can be applied to several other questions in which the new-firm
margin has the potential of playing an important role (e.g., transportation infrastructure). We
look forward to address some of these questions in our future research.
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A.1 Proof of Lemma
To prove the lemma, we first establish the following results regarding the joint distribution
of Y and Z.
P
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The proof follows closely from ARRY. For ease of notations, we omit n and s in the proof and
denote ξ = cdt̃.
P
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The first equality holds since by definition, φ̃ = φ
ξ
. The derivative of the CDF with respect to
an arbitrary element xk(o) is
P
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Evaluating the derivative of the CDF at a common productivity level z gives the joint proba-
bility for firms to choose k and n at that productivity level, which equals
P
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Evaluating the derivative of CDF at a common productivity level z, we have
P
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By the definition of conditional probability,
P
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Y = l(m)|Z = z
)
is not a function of z, implying that firms’ location choices






















































reflects not only the probability of locations among
exporting firms, but also the probability of locations among all firms, since independence
property implies P
(









z | Y = l(m)
)
as the productivity distribution conditional on locating in China’s province
l and regime m, and P
(
Z = z | Y = j
)
as the productivity distribution in foreign country
j. The independence implies that these two conditional productivity distributions have the























Using this, we can obtain the conditional distribution of unadjusted productivity as in equa-
tion (9).
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A.2 Decomposing the Aggregate Trade Elasticity


























New-firm and Export-regime Margins
.
1) The Intensive Margin of Trade Elasticity: recall that xl(m),n,s(φ) is the sales from l(m) to n
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θ − σ + 1
)
= θ − σ + 1.























is the share of firms that are engaged in regime m, conditional on








is the share of firms
that are located in province l, conditional on those that export to n. According to the chain
rule, ∂R
∂dl(m),n,s
is the summation of four terms. We derive each term as follows.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.3 The Derivation of Trade Shares and Price Index
The trade flows from l(m) to n can be written as (we drop subscripts n and s for most vari-
























































































, and ϑ = σ−1−θ
σ−1





as in (6), xl(m),n,s(φ̃) as in (22), and P
(
Z = φ̃ | Y = {l,m}
)
as in (9).




















































































































































. The third equality is








































































, and ϑ = σ−1−θ
σ−1
. As a simple representation, we can
A-8



















































































A.4 The Derivation of Labor Market Variables
Migration Share: Workers choose to work in the region-sector pair that brings them the




. Note that xg,l,s is drawn from Gg,l,s(x) = exp(−x
−κ) indepen-
dently across all regions and sectors. Denote gg,l,s as the probability density function of the































The second equality is obtained by using the functional form of Gg,l,s(x). The third equality
is derived by taking the integral.
A.5 Model Extension
We relax the distribution in equation (2) to allow for the correlation of productivity draws
across Chinese provinces to differ from the correlation of productivity draws across coun-
A-9










































all l, m, and j. This multivariate Pareto distribution has an additional correlation parame-
ter δ, which captures firms’ correlation of productivity draws across countries. It is worth
mentioning that δ not only captures the correlation of productivity draws between any two
foreign countries, but also captures the correlation between any China’s province and a for-
eign country. To see this, the joint distribution between an arbitrary province-regime l(m) in
China, and a foreign country j is
F
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Following similar steps as in the previous proof, one can obtain the share of country n’s








































A.6 Variables in Proportional Changes
Denote the proportional change for variable x as x̂ = x
′
x
, where x′ represents variables in
the counterfactual equilibrium, and x refers to variables in the observed equilibrium. The















. When r refers to a province-regime combination in China, then
P̂
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l(m),k . Âl(m),s =
̂̄Al(m),sL̂αl(m),s
contains both changes in fundamental productivity Āl(m),s and agglomeration effects that are induced through
Ll(m),s.
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B Additional Evidence on Internal Migrants
B.1 The Timing of Migration and Trade
We explore the time trend of provincial manufacturing exports and manufacturing migrant
employment stock for coastal provinces. Panel (a) of Figure 8 is for all five provinces, and
Panel (b) is for Guangdong Province only. We normalize both variables by their initial year
values. Exports are plotted in blue dashed lines and migration in red solid lines. The left-
hand panel shows that China’s exports grew steadily from the late 1980s to 2000, and accel-
erated after China’s accession into WTO in 2001. The red solid line suggests that the massive
rise in migrant workers appeared before 2000, prior to the turning point of China’s export
surge. Among the coastal provinces considered in Panel (a), manufacturing migrant employ-
ment grew steadily in both the period of 1990–2000 and the period of 2000–2005. Panel (b)
shows that in Guangdong Province, the epic rise in migrant employment of manufacturing
took place prior to 2000, and migrant employment grew relatively slowly after 2000. The
time-series evidence of migration and export growth shows that massive relocation of work-
ers to coastal provinces started, if not prior to, no later than the surge in Chinese exports
to the global market. The timing is consistent with the agglomeration at coastal provinces
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Figure 8: Growth in Exports and Manufacturing Migrant Employment for Coastal Provinces,
1990–2005
Notes: The migration data have three time points drawn from China’s Population Survey (1990, 2000, and 2005). The export data
are based on China’s Customs Transactions Database in the years 1988-1991, 1997, 2000, and 2005. The five coastal provinces
include Guangdong, Shanghai, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu. We deflate the export volume using inflation rates.
B.2 Sector’s Processing-export Specialization and Migrant Employment
We show that the fact—that sectors which had higher migrants’ employment shares were
more specialized in processing exports—holds in other coastal provinces including Shang-
hai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang Provinces. Figure 9 plots migrant employment shares against
the share of processing exports across manufacturing sectors for China’s coastal provinces.
We find a strong positive association between sector’s migrant employment shares and spe-
cialization in processing exports. The size of the circle reflects provincial processing export
volume in a given sector, and the blue dashed line is the linear regression fit (observations
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(c) Zhejiang
Figure 9: Provincial and Sectoral Migrant Employment Share vs. Share of Processing Exports
Notes: The blue dashed line is the linear fit weighted by province-sector processing export volume. The circle size reflects provin-
cial processing export volume in each sector.
C Data Description
Dimensions of the Model: We calibrate our model to 29 sectors, 30 Chinese provinces, 35
foreign countries and a constructed rest of the world. We exclude Tibet from our analysis
due to the lack of data on Tibet’s inter-provincial migration and trade. Our choice of the 35
countries is fully driven by the availability of both bilateral trade flow data and labor market
data. The 35 foreign countries and regions are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Cam-
bodia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Por-
tugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, US, and Viet
Nam.
China’s Provincial Imports and Exports by Regimes: China’s Customs Transactions Database
is collected by China’s General Administration of Customs. It covers very dis-aggregated in-
formation on imports and exports at the transaction level. For each transaction, it records the
trading price, quantity, firms’ name, identification number, zip code, and whether a trans-
action was processing or ordinary. We aggregate firm-level transactions into the provincial
level to obtain provincial imports and exports by processing and ordinary regimes with each
foreign country. The product type is reported using 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) classi-
fication.
China’s Inter-provincial Trade: We measure China’s inter-provincial bilateral trade flows
and provincial sectoral output using China’s regional input-output table. China’s National
Bureau of Statistics collected its first regional input-output survey in the year 1987. After
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1987, the survey has been collected for every five years. We use China’s input-output table
of the year 2007, which is the closest available year to the year 2005. We deflate these trade
flows and output to the year 2005 by the growth rate of China’s sectoral output between
2005 to 2007. China’s input-output table reports industries using 2-digit China’s Standard
Industrial Classification Code (CSIC), and contains 42 industries.
China Labor Market: We use China’s Population Survey 2005 and restrict the sample to
individuals who were between 20 and 60 years old and not attending schools to measure
China’s internal migration flows, wages, and sectoral employment. China’s Population Sur-
vey 2005 is a mini version of the population census. Our sample covers about 0.2% of overall
population, with roughly 2.6 million observations. The data provide detailed information
on individual’s provinces of Hukou registration, the current province of residence, sectors
and occupations of employment, and earnings. For the year 2005, we define China’s internal
migrants as those who work in a province other than the place of their Hukou registration.
The set of migrant population we measure reflects the effect of China’s Hukou reform on the
“floating population”. Our measure slightly differs from the previous literature. Tombe and
Zhu (2019) consider both inter-provincial migrants and rural-urban migrants during 2000–
2005; they define rural-urban migrants as those whose Hukou is in rural agriculture sector but
work in industrial sectors. Fan (2019) examines pre-2000 internal migrants who are defined
as the mismatch between workers’ place of residence and birthplace.
We use the survey data to construct the labor stock by each group {Lg} and origin-
destination-sector-level migration rates {Λg,l,s} for each of our 30 labor groups based on
provinces of Hukou registration, g, at each destination province, l, and at each sector, s. We
also measure the average income earned by each labor group at each destination and sector,
which is denoted as {wg,m,s}. For groups which have insufficient observations at a given
origin-destination-sector cell, we assign the average destination-sector wage to that group.
Industrial Aggregation and Crosswalks: China’s Customs Transactions Database reports
product types using 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) classification, China’s input-output ta-
ble reports industries using 2-digit China’s Standard Industrial Classification Code (CSIC)
for 42 industries, and China’s Population Census uses China’s Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation Code (CSIC) for 96 industries. In addition, we extract bilateral trade flows between
foreign countries using STAN Bilateral Trade Database and draw tariff data from the TRAINS
data. The former one uses ISIC industry codes, whereas the latter one uses 6-digit HS prod-
uct codes. The OECD database provides input-output tables for 48 countries for the years
1995, 2000, and 2005, and contains information for 37 ISIC Rev 3 industries.
Our strategy is to map HS codes or CSIC industry codes to the 2-digit ISIC code, and
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after that we group the 2-digit ISIC code to our 29 industry aggregations as shown by Table
8. Specifically, we map 8-digit and 6-digit HS codes to the 4-digit ISIC Rev 3 code based on
the concordance which is provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The con-
cordance is available on the WITS website.51 The 4-digit ISIC code has 145 unique industries.
We aggregate the 4-digit ISIC code to the 2-digit ISIC code where the cluster can be simply
done based on the first two digits of the 4-digits ISIC code. We also map China’s CSIC code
to the 2-digit ISIC code using the concordance in Dean and Lovely (2010).
Table 8: Tradable and Non-tradable Industries by International Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation (ISIC) Revision 3
Industry ISIC, Rev 3
Panel A: 16 Tradable Industries
Food products, beverages and tobacco C15T16
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear C17T19
Wood and products of wood and cork C20
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing C21T22
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel C23
Chemicals and chemical products C24
Rubber and plastics products C25
Other non-metallic mineral products C26
Basic metals C27
Fabricated metal products C28
Machinery and equipment, nec C29
Computer, Electronic and optical equipment C30T33X
Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec C31
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers C34
Other transport equipment C35
Manufacturing nec; recycling C36T37






Hotels and restaurants C55
Transportation and communications C60T64
Financial intermediation C65T67
Real estate and business services C70T74
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security C75
Education C80




Foreign Labor Markets: We only consider one aggregate labor group for each of the foreign
countries that we included. Therefore, the information required for each of the foreign labor
markets is a vector of shares of sectoral employment, {Λg,i,s}, and a vector of sectoral average
wages, {wg,i,s}. We extract data from IPUMS–International and Luxembourg income study
(LIS) to construct these variables. The ISIC code is available in both datasets, however man-
ufacturing industries are reported as a single aggregation. For each country, we thus divide
the share of manufacturing employment into 16 detailed (tradable) manufacturing sectors by
using proportions of countries’ sectoral output. When wage variables are missing in IPUM-
International or LIS, we supplement sectoral wages with the Occupational Wages around the
World (OWW) Database. We assume that within each country, the average wage is the same
across all 16 detailed manufacturing sectors. Then we assign the average sectoral wage at
the broad manufacturing sector into detailed categories. Details of the data sources used for
foreign countries are provided by the table below.
Table 9: Data Sources to Measure Foreign Labor Markets
Data Source wg,i,s Λg,i,s
IPUMS-International Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico,







South Africa, Spain, Thailand,
Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States, Vietnam
Luxembourg Income Study Austria, Chile, Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Germany,




Finland, Germany, Hong Kong,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Norway,
Singapore
Occupational Wages around the
World
Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam N/A
Measuring the Location Choice Probability of Firms: We first use equilibrium conditions
(6) – (11) to pin down the relative probability between any two locations (including any
foreign country and China’s provinces). Second, we divide provincial firms into processing
and ordinary regimes using equilibrium conditions which imply the provincial share of firms
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where t̃i,n,s denotes China’s export tariff. Πl(m),n,s and Πj,n,s are n’s expenditure share in sector























for all l and j from the system of equations (33) and (34).
Next, the share of provincial firms in each regime m equals the share of exports, such that
P
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D Indirect Inference of Structural Parameters
Below we describe the procedure we used to jointly search for the value of {γ, ρ}:
1. We start with an initial guess of {γ0, ρ0}.
2. Given ρ0, we choose γ to target the extent to which the number of firms responded
to migration shocks, targeting the estimate of Columns (3) in Table 1. We introduce
changes in migration costs between 1990 and 2005 to our quantitative model which is
calibrated to the year 2005. We search for a value of γ such that the model-generated
data can produce the same estimate of β1 as in Column (3) of Table 1. We compute the
model-generated changes in the number of firms in a province-sector as the weighted
average of changes in firms’ location probability (in that province-sector) across desti-
nation markets. The weights are the output sold to each destination market. We use
the same instrument and controls as in Table 1.
3. Given γ0, we choose ρ to target the extent to which the number of ordinary exporters
responded to import tariff reductions, targeting the estimate of Columns (3) in Table
2. We introduce China’s import tariff reductions between 2000 and 2005 to our model.
Again, we calibrate our model to the year 2005 and search for a value of ρ such that the
model-generated data can produce the same estimate of b2 as in Column (3) in Table 2.
Again, we compute the model-generated changes in the number of firms for a province-
sector-regime as the weighted average of changes in firms’ location probability (in that
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province-sector-regime) across destination markets. The weights are the output sold to
each destination market. We use the same instrument and controls as in Table 2.
4. We update {γ0, ρ0} with {γ1, ρ1} and iterate Steps 1–3 until the convergence of {γ, ρ}.
E Quantitative Results of Alternative Model with Firm Entry
We provide quantitative results using an alternative model with firm entry. The model as-
sumes that to establish a firm in region r and sector s, entrepreneurs need to hire f er,s units
of labor. In the equilibrium, the number of firms in a region-sector is determined by the
free-entry condition, which requires firms’ average profits to equal entry costs. We suppress
firm’s location choices and we maintain other settings of productivity distributions to be con-
sistent with the baseline model. For a Chinese firm in province l and sector s, its productivity


















= 1 − Aj,sφ
−θ
j,s . We calibrate
the model with firm entry to the observed economy in 2005 and still apply the Exact Hat
Algebra to perform counterfactual exercises without needing the estimates of entry costs.
For ease of comparison, we use the same parameter values in the model with firm entry as
in our baseline model, except for the absence of relocation parameter γ.
Table 10: Comparison of Baseline Model and Model with Firm Entry
Policy shock
baseline model
(no relocation, γ = 0)
baseline model
(with relocation, γ = 0.63)
alternative model
(with firm entry)
Migration shock 0.91 1.29 1.58
Import tariff 1.08 2.30 1.31
Export tariff 0.88 1.48 0.98
Combined policies 2.87 5.07 3.87






×100, where êxport is the proportional changes of export volume between
the observed equilibrium and the counterfactual.
Table 10 presents the effects of three policy changes on export growth, for the model
with firm entry and our baseline model with and without firm relocation. We highlight
two findings. First, the export effects of migration shocks were much stronger in the model
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with firm entry than in our baseline model with relocation. In the model with firm entry,
the large export effect of migration is because the free-entry condition implies the number
of firms is proportional to employment size. In contrast, in our model, local employment
growth indirectly affects firms’ location choices through lowering the labor costs. Second,
the effects of tariff reductions were smaller in the model with firm entry than in our model
with relocation. In the model with firm entry, the total measure of firms in a region-sector
is determined by firms’ total revenues. Because exports only accounted for a small fraction
of firms’ revenues, the changes in firm entry tended to be small. In contrast, in our model,
firms choose production locations by minimizing the unit cost of exports, which is directly
affected by the tariff changes.
The rest of this section presents the equilibrium conditions for the alternative model with
















where Ml,s is the number of firms in province l and sector s, and Mj,s is the number of firms
in country j and sector s. Analogously, the share of country n’s expenditure in sector s that













where ψl(m),n,s, Ψl,n,s, and Ψj,s are still identically defined as in the main text except for γ = 0.




































− η is the profit ratio after taking into account marketing costs. The
free-entry condition for foreign countries can be obtained analogously.
Third, because entrepreneurs’ profits now accrue to workers that they hire for entry, the
E-20
market clearing condition for final goods in Chinese provinces is





























Πr,l(O),sEl(O),s and Il(P) = 0.
Finally, because a portion of labor is used for entry, the labor-market clearing condition
























The left-hand side now includes entry costs.
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Figure 12: Provincial Annual Export Growth Rate Between 1990 and 2005
Notes: the black dots are four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1980; the red dots are 14 national Economic and Technological







































Notes: Here we show the changes in migration costs by destination provinces for manufacturing sector, which are the migrant-






































Notes: Here we show the changes in migration costs by destination provinces for all sectors, which are the migrant-population
weighted average across origin provinces and sectors.
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(a) Jiangsu Ordinary Exporters (b) Jiangsu Processing Exporters
(c) Zhejiang Ordinary Exporters (d) Zhejiang Processing Exporters





Notes: The histogram is plotted across all foreign destinations and sectors, where China’s export volume was greater than 30









takes values smaller than 3.
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Policy Shock θ = 3, γ = 0,
ρ = 0
θ = 4, γ = 0,
ρ = 0
θ = 4, ρ = 0.81,
γ = 0
θ = 4, ρ = 0.81,
γ = 0.63
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Guangdong Province
Migration Shock 1.97 2.54 2.45 4.00
Import Tariff 0.80 1.12 1.01 2.34
Export Tariff 0.73 0.96 1.01 1.90
Shanghai
Migration Shock 1.48 1.86 1.81 2.36
Import Tariff 0.84 1.11 0.95 1.75
Export Tariff 0.60 0.75 0.79 1.26
Jiangsu
Migration Shock 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.38
Import Tariff 0.73 0.99 0.90 1.83
Export Tariff 0.67 0.88 0.92 1.63
Notes: the values are in units of percentage points. They are calculated in the same way as described in Table 5.
Table 12: Statistics of Manufacturing Foreign-invested Firms Registered between 1990–2005
By sector By place of origin
ISIC code #entrants, 90–05 share region #entrants, 90–05 share
C17T19 20,526 20.1% Hong Kong 37,767 37.0%
C15T16 11,329 11.1% Taiwan 14,054 13.8%
C29 9,949 9.7% Korea 10,802 10.6%
C24 8,854 8.7% United States 10,186 10.0%
C36T37 8,184 8.0% Japan 9,171 9.0%
C30T33X 7,965 7.8% Singapore 2,827 2.8%
C31 7,728 7.6% British Virgin Isds 2,540 2.5%
C25 6,254 6.1% Canada 1,638 1.6%
C28 5,196 5.1% Australia 1,523 1.5%
C26 5,152 5.0% Germany 1,184 1.2%
C35 3,307 3.2% Macau 1,072 1.1%
C21T22 2,410 2.4% United Kingdom 858 0.8%
C20 2,366 2.3% France 682 0.7%
C27 1,475 1.4% Malaysia 667 0.7%
C23 1,377 1.3% Italy 644 0.6%
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